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Along for the Ride: GPS and the
Fourth Amendment
ABSTRACT

With the advent of new technologies, the line as to where the
Fourth Amendment forbids certain police behavior and when it does
not has become increasingly blurred. Recently, the issue of whether
police may use Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices to
track individualsfor prolonged periods of time without first securing a
search warrant has crept its way into the limelight. The various
circuits have arrived at different conclusions, and the question has now
found its way onto the US Supreme Court's docket.
After analyzing and weighing both Supreme Court caselaw and
policy
considerations, this Note concludes that the D.C. Circuit's
public
"Mosaic Theory"-that the collection of discreet trips in a vehicle tells
more than any individual movement, and therefore is protected by the
Fourth Amendment-is misguided and strays from the Supreme
Court's analysis in United States v. Knotts. Rather, existing caselaw
and policy considerations better support the Ninth and Seventh
Circuits' rulings that GPS tracking does not fall within Fourth
Amendment protection. The question remains as to how the Supreme
Court will rule on the issue and where the Court will draw the line
between privacy concerns and police needs with regards to the
increasingrole of surveillance technology.
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Imagine driving your car along the Pacific Coast Highway on a
warm Sunday afternoon. The view is so striking that you decide to
pull onto an overlook to take some pictures of the sun setting over the
ocean. As you make your way to the barrier separating the road from
the steep cliffs, you feel exhilarated by the cool sea breeze and the
magnificent scene before you. After capturing the brilliant sunset
with your camera, you whirl around to take one last picture of your
beloved red '68 Mustang. That is when you notice an unusual shadow.
A quick examination reveals a small black box affixed to the underside
of the bumper. Alarmed but curious, you hop back into the car and
throw it into gear. The once gleaming scenery dissolves in the
periphery of your vision as your eyes focus steadily on the road in
front of you. Your thoughts are consumed with the mysterious black
box-what is it and who put it there? Once at home, you grab some
tools and immediately try to remove the object. Hesitant to cause any
damage when it does not easily disengage, you decide instead to
conduct an Internet search. After an hour of perusing various
websites, you finally have an answer-the little black box is a Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking device. But who would want to spy
on you? You are not an intelligence agent or a convicted criminal, and
you cannot imagine your ex-fianc6 taking such measures to get back at
you. Could it be the government? Surely, this type of action would
require a warrant. However, depending on where you are in the
United States, law enforcement may not need a warrant before
secretly placing a GPS device on your car and tracking your every
move.1
While the Fourth Amendment establishes protection for
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures, 2 the US
1.
CompareUnited States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when it secretly placed a GPS device on
defendant's car to monitor his actions), with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212,
1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment when
it secretly placed mobile tracking devices on defendant's car to monitor his actions).

2.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Courts of Appeals have diverging opinions on whether prolonged
surveillance by electronic means is a violation of that prohibition. 3
The debate among the circuits centers on whether police should be
required to obtain a warrant before installing these devices. 4 The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits maintain that because the road system is
a public domain, individuals do not have a "reasonable expectation of
privacy" to the location of their cars; thus, GPS tracking without a
warrant does not violate Fourth Amendment rights.5 Alternatively,
the D.C. Circuit has held that this type of snooping challenges
everything the Fourth Amendment stands to protect. 6 Generating
considerable debate as technological advances allow law enforcement
to engage in such activities, this question is likely to repeat itself in
local, state, and federal courts, making it ripe for review. The
Supreme Court of the United States ("Supreme Court") recently
granted certiorari on the issue,7 and will provide guidance as to
whether such surveillance oversteps constitutional boundaries.
This Note argues that the Fourth Amendment allows law
enforcement to use GPS technology to perform prolonged remote
surveillance without a warrant. To support this contention, Part I
provides a brief overview of the Fourth Amendment and the
corresponding exclusionary rule. It also examines how the Supreme
Court, as well as lower federal courts, has viewed electronic
surveillance under various situations. Part II reviews the circuit split
and analyzes the Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits' divergent
reasoning. Part III explains the public policy and legal rationales that
support GPS tracking of suspects' vehicles, irrespective of duration,
without a warrant. In this portion, the Note draws analogies between
GPS surveillance, in-person surveillance, and surveillance through
video technology to support the conclusion that police are not
restricted by the Fourth Amendment when tracking a car through
electronic means.8

3.
See supra note 1.
4.
See supra note 1.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214-15; United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997
5.
(7th Cir. 2007).
See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding
6.
that law enforcement violated the Fourth Amendment when it secretly placed a GPS device on
defendant's car to monitor his actions).
7.
See Greg Nojeim, Court Rules that Warrant is Required for Stored Cell Site Location
Information, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.cdt.org/blogs/
(stating that
greg-nojeim/129court-rules-warrant-required-stored-cell-site-location-information
the Supreme Court will review the Maynard decision during the October 2011 term).
8.
See discussion infra Part III.
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I. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE RISE OF A
"REASONABLE EXPECTATION"

The United States Constitution affords its citizens the right to
privacy-government officials are not permitted to conduct searches
without probable cause. 9 For the purpose of this Note, it is important
to delve into the judicial history of the Fourth Amendment, and how
the Court has treated technological advances within its Fourth
Amendment framework.
A. The Exclusionary Rule and a "ReasonableExpectation of Privacy"
The Fourth Amendment states that citizens have the right to
be secure in their own "persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures."1 0 Courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" standard to determine whether an action is an
If an individual can
infringement of Fourth Amendment rights."
demonstrate that he reasonably expected that his activity would not
be accessible to the public, then that activity is within the realm of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 12 Accordingly, the
Federal Rules of Evidence bar any evidence collected in violation of a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights from admission at trial-this
principle is known as the exclusionary rule. 13
As a result, courts must determine if law enforcement obtained
the evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 4 Weeks v. United
States first outlined this type of analysis when it established the
In Weeks, police entered and searched the
exclusionary rule.15
neither a warrant nor the defendant's
with
defendant's room
The police seized letters and other articles and
permission.16
subsequently submitted them as evidence in a criminal case involving
mail fraud charges.1 7 The Supreme Court held that the officers
9.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

Id.
10.
See, e.g., Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (finding that the defendant's Fourth
11.
Amendment rights had been violated because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements).
E.g., id. at 558.
12.
E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969).
13.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1914).
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 386.
16.
Id.
17.
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searched the defendant's room improperly and seized the items
unlawfully, so the prosecution could not use that evidence in the
criminal trial against the defendant.18 Allowing improperly seized
items to be admitted into evidence would render the Fourth
Amendment meaningless and would deny the accused his
constitutional rights. 19
Building on Weeks, the Supreme Court ruled in Katz v. United
States that government officials could not introduce evidence gathered
by tapping a public phone. 20 The defendant in Katz used a public
telephone booth to call in illegal gambling bets. 2 1 According to the
Court, these surveillance techniques invaded the defendant's privacy
and violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 22 Despite being in a
public area, the defendant made concerted efforts to conceal his
speech, including shutting the door to the booth so that no one could
listen in on his conversation. 23 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Harlan rationalized "that an enclosed telephone booth is an area
where, like a home, and unlike a field, a person has a constitutionally
protected reasonable expectation of privacy." 24 The ruling in Katz
overturned Olmstead v. United States, wherein the Supreme Court
had held that wiretapping was not a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and was thus admissible as
evidence in a criminal trial. 25 Katz provided courts a standard to
determine whether various environments should be afforded Fourth
Amendment protections-whether or not a person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." 26
B. The Open FieldsDoctrine
The open fields doctrine theorizes that an individual does not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open field (or any open
space), as a "field" is not a part of the constitutionally protected
"persons, houses, paper, and effects." 27 First espoused in Hester v.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 356-57.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Id. at 362.
Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
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United States,28 the open fields doctrine applied because the defendant
was accused of exchanging "illicitly distilled" moonshine whiskey in an
open field adjacent to his house. 29 Because the exchange had taken
place in an open field, in wide view of the public, the warrantless
"search" that occurred was not within the bounds of the Fourth
Amendment's protection. 30 By applying a strict interpretation, the
Court found that because the field was not part of the defendant's
"persons, houses, paper, [nor] effects" the officer's actions did not
amount to a "search" prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.3 1
Limiting the broad determination that the Fourth Amendment
never protects activity in open fields, Katz instead created the
circumstance-intensive standard requiring review of whether an
individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 32 Therefore, if a
defendant was able to prove that a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed for activities conducted in an open field, he may have evidence
of those activities excluded from trial if officers collected the evidence
without permission or a warrant. 3 3
The Katz holding, however, did not completely do away with
the open fields doctrine. 34 In Oliver v. United States, the Supreme
Court once again held that a search in an open field did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 35 The police discovered that a defendant had
grown marijuana in an open field. 36 Despite Katz, Oliver stands to
show that society does not recognize an individual's expectation of
privacy 37 in open fields as reasonable, even if privately owned, fenced,
and marked with 'No Trespassing' signs, because there is no barrier to
public view of the field. 3 8 Further,
an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors
in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. . . . The [Fourth]
Amendment reflects the recognition of the Framers that certain enclaves should be free
from arbitrary government interference. For example, the [Supreme] Court since the
enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed "the overriding respect for the

28.
Id.
29.
Id. at 58.
30.
Id.
Id. at 59.
31.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32.
See id. at 360-62 (establishing the reasonable expectation of privacy standard).
33.
34.
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984) ("We conclude that the open
fields doctrine, as enunciated in Hester, is consistent with the plain language of the Fourth
Amendment and its historical purposes.").
Id.
35.
Id. at 173.
36.
Id. at 178.
37.
Id. at 179.
38.
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sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
39
Republic."

The open fields doctrine is directly applicable to the issue
presented in this Note because, like open fields, roads are publicly
accessible and everyone can view an individual's actions on public
roads. Everyone has direct access to roads, and as a result, no person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his location if he is
using publicly accessible thoroughfares. 40 As the Court in Oliver
articulated, the framers envisioned the Fourth Amendment to provide
privacy in certain settings including homes and other enclaves. 4 1
However, privacy protections do not extend to all locations or all
circumstances because there are certain places where society does not
recognize privacy expectations as reasonable. 42
C. Technological Developments
The Supreme Court created a framework to guide law
enforcement officials' efforts to use new technology as a warrantless
means of secret surveillance without violating the Fourth
Amendment. 43 For example, placing a radio tracker (a "beeper") in a
defendant's car does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment because
the information obtained through that device could have been gained
through unaided visual surveillance. 44 In United States v. Knotts, the
police suspected that the defendant purchased chloroform to
manufacture illegal drugs. 45 Police planted a beeper in a container of
chloroform and arranged for a supplier to sell it to the defendant. 46
Law enforcement officials then used the beeper to track the location of
the chloroform, which ultimately led them to the defendant's secluded
cabin. 47 The defendant argued that the beeper and tracking activities

39.
Id. at 178 (citations omitted) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601
(1980)).
40.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements
from one place to another.").
41.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses.
); see also Oliver v.
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (finding that a field was not a place where society recognized
42.
a reasonable expectation of privacy).
43.
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984); Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277.
44.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
45.
Id. at 278.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
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violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 48 The Supreme Court found
that a person driving on public roads does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements. 49 The court rationalized that
when a driver travels on public roads, that driver conveys to anyone
who wishes to observe what direction he is going, what his destination
is, and what stops he made.5 0 Justice Rehnquist went on to state:
"Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
case."5 1 He also noted: "A police car following [the defendant] at a
distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the
public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respondent, with
the drum of chloroform still in the car." 5 2 The defendant had no
expectation of privacy on the roadway; thus, police did not violate his
Fourth Amendment rights. 53
However, in a subsequent case, United States v. Karo, the
Court held that unrestricted use of beeper technology for
"[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn
from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth
Amendment oversight." 54 Thus, the Supreme Court prohibits the use
of technology to glean information that could not have been otherwise
obtained.55 In Karo, drug enforcement agents planted a beeping
device (similar to the one in Knotts) in a can of ether that the
defendant purchased. 56 The agents tracked the device for four
months, ultimately arresting the defendant after determining that the
canister of ether had come to rest in the defendant's home.5 7 The
police's use of the beeper violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights because, unlike the information gleaned during the Knotts
investigation,5 8 this beeper provided information that could not have
been ascertained by the naked eye: the fact that the ether was inside

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 279.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 285.
Id.
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984).
See id.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 714.
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the defendant's house. 59 The Court stated that while the use of the
beeper device to determine that the ether was located in the
defendant's home was not as extensive as a full-blown search, it still
revealed information that police could not have discovered without
otherwise obtaining a warrant.6 0 The Supreme Court voiced its
concerns regarding free use of the beeper technology, stating in the
Karo opinion that the use of technology to monitor property that has
been removed from public view would be a serious threat to privacy
interests.6 1 Because police used technology to collect information that
they could not have obtained without it, the Court found this to be an
intrusion of privacy. 62
The Fourth Amendment also prohibits using other devices that
reveal information about homes, even without physically entering the
premises. 63 In Kyllo v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court
excluded evidence that the police collected based on information
obtained through a heat-detecting device. 64 A judge had granted a
warrant to search for a marijuana-growing operation after the device
(which police used in a publicly accessible area) showed that the roof
and walls of the defendant's garage were emitting an unusually large
amount of heat energy.6 5 During an initial evidentiary hearing, the
district court considered the technology
a non-intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude visual image of
the heat being radiated from the outside of the house"; it "did not show any people or
activity within the walls of the structure"; "the device used cannot penetrate walls or
windows to reveal conversations or human activities"; and "no intimate details of the
66
home were observed.

Nevertheless, on appeal, the Supreme Court found that the use of the
device infringed upon Kyllo's Fourth Amendment rights and
constituted an improper search of his home. 67 The Court held that
using "sense-enhancing technology" to gather information pertaining
to the interior of the home that could not have been obtained other
than through physical entrance constitutes an unconstitutional search
59.
Id. ("This case thus presents the question whether the monitoring of a beeper in a
private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment ...
60.
Id. at 715.
61.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715-16. The Court ultimately upheld the defendant's conviction on other
62.
grounds. Id. at 706.
63.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001).
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 30.
66.
Id. (citation omitted).
67.
Id. at 40.
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of the home, particularly when the technology is not part of everyday
use. The government argued that the heat emitted from the house was
heat from the exterior of the home and therefore detection did not
intrude into the home.6 8 The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
stating that this was an overly "mechanical" interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.6 9 The Court found support for its stance in Katz,
where the sounds that police recorded from outside a phone booth
constituted an improper search. 70 The Court emphasized the longstanding notion that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in their homes.7 1
The holdings in Karo and Kyllo echo the Court's reservations
regarding privacy and technological advancements in law
enforcement. 72 Thus, when the Court examines whether police should
be allowed to install and monitor GPS tracking devices on cars
without a warrant, it will likely consider the issue with this
skepticism in mind. The Framers conceived of the Fourth Amendment
when the only types of searches and seizures were those that occurred
in person. 73 As a result, courts today face the difficult task of
interpreting privacy rights with respect to evolving technology.
D. GPS Technology
For the purposes of this Note, it is important to consider the
uses of a GPS tracker, how it works, and how it differs from the beeper
technology in Knotts and Karo. GPS uses satellites to monitor and
track the locations of various receivers (the tracking devices) on
Earth. 74 Using signals from these satellites, authorities are able to
track the exact longitude, latitude, and altitude of the devices.7 5 By
attaching a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage or bumper of a
car, police can pinpoint the location of a vehicle at any time as long as

68.
Id. at 35.
69.
Id.
Id.
70.
71.
Id. at 40 ("We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the
entrance to the house."' (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))).
72.
See id. (finding the police's use of technology violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984) (holding that the police may
not use beeper technology to glean information from inside a person's home).
The United States Constitution was adopted in 1787 and ratified in 1788.
73.
Constitution of the United States, UNITED STATES SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/civics/
constitution item/constitution.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
74.
GPS Overview, GPS.GOv, http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps (last visited Sept. 25,
2011).
75.
Id.
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the tracking device is still affixed to the automobile.7 6 Unlike the
beeper technology at issue in Knotts and Karo, GPS does not require
that the receiving device be within close proximity to track its
location. 7 Instead, GPS allows police to locate a vehicle remotely at
any time.7 8 In effect, police are able to monitor a vehicle's location
without any in-person tracking.79
II. ANALYSIS: NAVIGATING THROUGH THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
At the heart of the circuit split is whether police may use GPS
devices to monitor a vehicle's movement without first receiving a
warrant to attach or track the device.8 0 The basis for the dilemma is
rooted in the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 1 Courts agree that installing
and monitoring these devices are not seizures, which the Court defines
as a "meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests
in [his] property." 82 A GPS device does not "affect the car's driving
qualities, [does] not draw power from the car's engine or battery,
[does] not take up room that might otherwise have been occupied by
passengers or packages .

.

. and in short [does] not 'seize' the car in

any intelligible sense of the word." 83 Despite this, courts disagree
about whether using a GPS tracker constitutes an improper search.84
As stated in Katz, the test for whether police may search
without a warrant is whether a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the thing or location searched. 85 The Seventh and Ninth
Circuits take the approach that GPS tracking does not infringe upon
this right, and that GPS devices placed on vehicles monitor activities
for which people have no reasonable expectation of privacy. 6 The
D.C. Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, finding that such use of

76.
See id. ('The user segment consists of the GPS receiver equipment, which receives
the signals from the GPS satellites and uses the transmitted information to calculate the user's
three-dimensional position and time.").
77.
Steve Uhrig, Vehicle Tracking Systems-Are They for You?, SWS SECURITY,
http://www.swssec.com/tracka.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
78.
See id.
79.
See id.
80.
See supranote 1.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
474 F.3d at

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
See supranote 1.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215-16 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia,
998.
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GPS technology invades a person's right to privacy, arguing that a
person's accumulated trips tell more about that person's behavior than
any single journey.8 7 The question raises concerns pertaining to both
security and privacy in the modern age of electronic surveillance.

A. Seventh and Ninth Circuits'Approach
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits recently ruled that the use of
GPS tracking devices does not interfere with a person's expectation of
privacy, and therefore police do not need a warrant to install and
monitor a device on a person's car.88 The use of a car is generally
confined to publicly accessible roadways; therefore, GPS surveillance
of a vehicle does not infringe on a person's Fourth Amendment rights,
according to these courts. 89
In the Seventh Circuit case United States v. Garcia, the court
found the defendant guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine.9 0
Shortly after Garcia left prison, a third party reported to police that
Garcia had delivered methamphetamine to him and announced that
Garcia intended to begin manufacturing the drug again. 9 1 Police
began to monitor Garcia's activitieS92 and discovered that he was
After
purchasing common ingredients of methamphetamine. 93
learning that Garcia was driving a borrowed Ford Tempo, 94 police
attached a GPS "memory-tracking" device to record all of the car's
movements.9 5 When police later retrieved the device, they used it to
determine all of the car's locations and paths since its installation.9 6
They searched a large tract of land the car had repeatedly visited and
discovered equipment and materials used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine; 97 they later used this information to prosecute
Garcia. 98
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the installation and use of the
"memory tracking device" was not an unconstitutional search and
87.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
88.
Pineda-Moreno,591 F.3d at 1215-16; Garcia,474 F.3d at 998.
89.
See, e.g., Garcia,474 F.3d at 996 (referencing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), for the proposition that there is no expectation of privacy on public roads).
90.
Id. at 995.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
95.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 996.
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seizure. 99 According to the court, the GPS tracking was more similar
to surveillance cameras and satellite imaging and dissimilar to the
Unlike the device in Kyllo, this GPS
heat monitors in Kyllo.0
tracking device did not help police perceive something they could not
have observed through the naked eye.10 1 Here, police could have used
twenty-four-hour, in-person surveillance to obtain the same
information.102 GPS tracking devices are simply substitutes for legal
"in-person surveillance," according to the Seventh Circuit, and are
therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 103
Judge Posner was quick to point out in Garcia that the court's
holding in no way endorsed or made a decision with regard to mass
surveillance. 10 4 The court recognized a difference between mass
surveillance of the general public using GPS systems and the use of
GPS tracking devices to observe one suspect for a prolonged period.10
The court stated that it would be premature to rule that mass
surveillance raised no questions under the Fourth Amendment, and
that the hiring of "another 10 million police officers" is not necessarily
an efficient substitute for GPS tracking. 106 Posner further asserted,
"[t]echnological progress poses a threat to privacy by enabling an
extent of surveillance that in earlier times would have been
prohibitively expensive."1 0 7 As a result, the holding in Garcia only
applies to the occasional surveillance of a single subject, and not to
any widespread government surveillance program.1os
In the Ninth Circuit case United States v. Pineda-Moreno, a
drug enforcement officer noticed a group of men purchasing fertilizer
commonly used to cultivate marijuana plants. 0 9 The agent followed
the men's vehicle and later determined that the defendant, PinedaMoreno, owned it.110 Police affixed GPS mobile tracking devices to the
defendant's car seven different times, sometimes entering onto
Id. at 997.
99.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. ("The substitute here is for an activity, namely following a car on a public street,
that is unequivocally not a search within the meaning of the amendment.").
103.
Id.
104.
Id. at 998.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See id. ("Should government someday decide to institute programs of mass
surveillance of vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.").
109.
United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010).
110.
Id.
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Pineda-Moreno's driveway to do so.111 Using the GPS devices, police
tracked the defendant leaving a suspected marijuana grow site. 1 12
Eventually, officers pulled the vehicle over, smelled marijuana, and
arrested the defendant. 113
The Ninth Circuit found that neither the installation of the
GPS device nor the tracking of Pineda-Moreno's vehicle violated the
Fourth Amendment.1 1 4 Additionally, the court determined that the
police's action of entering onto the defendant's driveway to install the
device also did not violate the Fourth Amendment.1 15 While the
driveway was "within the curtilage of [Pineda-Moreno's] home," it was
not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy since Pineda-Moreno
had not taken any steps to shield the driveway from the public.116
There was no fence or barrier obstructing the driveway from public
view or access, nor was there a sign stating "[n]o [t]respassing." 17
Therefore, Pineda-Moreno had no expectation that people would not
enter onto his driveway freely."i8
The prolonged, round-the-clock surveillance of Pineda-Moreno
was not deemed an improper search under Fourth Amendment
standards.1 19 While the defense asserted that the Supreme Court's
holding in Kyllo directly applied to the case at hand, stating that "law
enforcement officers conduct a 'search' whenever they use senseenhancing technology not available to the general public to obtain
information," the court rejected this contention. 120 In Kyllo, the
technology was used to peer into the defendant's house-an area that
the Fourth Amendment explicitly protects. 121 In the present case, the
GPS monitored the defendant only in areas that were open to the
public; thus, the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
these locations. 122 As a result, the Ninth Circuit found that placing a
GPS tracking device on a vehicle without first procuring a warrant
does not constitute a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 123

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 1214.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1215.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
Id. at 1216.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1217.
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B. D.C. CircuitApproach
While the Seventh and Ninth Circuits both hold that installing
and tracking GPS devices on vehicles does not violate Fourth
Amendment protections, 124 the D.C. Circuit takes the opposing
position. 125
In United States v. Maynard, police began investigating a
nightclub owner, Jones, for narcotics offenses; they monitored his
activities for four weeks after installing a GPS tracking device on his
Jeep. 126 Using the tracking results, the government pieced together a
case against Jones and successfully prosecuted him.127 Jones appealed
his conviction on the grounds that the GPS surveillance of his car was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 128
Finding for the defendant, the D.C. Circuit stated that Knotts
did not control the present case because it had dealt with different
The Circuit Court noted that in Knotts, the
circumstances.12 9
Supreme Court had never answered the question as to whether
prolonged, twenty-four-hour surveillance using technological devices is
an improper search under the Fourth Amendment. 3 0 The Knotts
officers followed the defendant for only a short period of time and
ceased tracking activities as soon as they learned that the car had
come to rest at a certain location. 13 1 In Maynard, however, the police
used GPS tracking to survey Jones' movements for almost a month.132
While Jones did not necessarily have an expectation of privacy for
individual trips on public roads, the totality of his movement was
subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, as "the likelihood
anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil."13 3 Along
these lines, the court found that the totality of one's movements

124.
See United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007).
125.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
126.
Id. at 549-55.
127.
Id. at 549.
128.
Id. at 555.
129.
Id. at 556-58.
130.
Id. at 556-57.

131.

Id.

132.

Id. at 558.

133.

Id.
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reveals more than any individual movement; therefore, prolonged
surveillance using GPS monitoring violates the Fourth Amendment: 134
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he
does ensemble. These types of information can each reveal more about a person than
does any individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, or
a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one's not visiting any of these
places over the course of a month. 135

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review this case during the
October 2011 term and will determine whether prolonged surveillance
is constitutional. 136
C. The Seventh Circuit Response to Maynard
After the D.C. Circuit handed down its Maynard ruling, the
Seventh Circuit had a chance to reconsider its position on the use of
GPS and its Fourth Amendment implications in United States v.
Cuevas-Perez.13 7 In CueUas-Perez, the Phoenix police used a GPS
tracking device to monitor the defendant's vehicle for more than sixty
hours and through five states. 138 Earlier, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) agents had observed, through use of a pole camera,
Cuevas-Perez manipulating the hatch and rear door panels of his Jeep
Laredo outside of his home. 139 The ICE agents told Phoenix police
they suspected Cuevas-Peres might be involved in drug distribution,
so the police attached the GPS to the defendant's vehicle while it was
parked in a public area. 140 Upholding Garcia,the court found that, in
this instance, the use of the GPS tracking device did not violate the
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 141 The court distinguished the
case at bar from Maynard, explaining that the sixty-hour surveillance
period in Cuevas-Perez was not a prolonged search and therefore did
not raise the same implications as the surveillance in Maynard.142
The court, however, did not dismiss the possibility that prolonged
monitoring may implicate Fourth Amendment concerns.1 4 3
134.
Id. at 561-62.
135.
Id. at 562.
136.
See Nojeim, supra note 7 (stating that the Supreme Court will review the Maynard
decision during the October 2011 term).
137.
United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 272 (2011).
138.
Id. at 272-73.
139.
Id.
140.
Id.
141.
Id. at 275-76.
142.
Id. at 274-75.
143.
Id. at 275.
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In his concurring opinion, Judge Flaum went a step further
and addressed whether a prolonged search would have violated the
His response was a
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 144
resounding no. 145 According to Judge Flaum, the Maynard ruling was
incorrect in finding that Knotts did not control the issue of GPS
Judge Flaum asserted that the Supreme Court
surveillance. 146
consistently recognizes that people do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy when they reveal their actions to others. 147 He
went on to attack the D.C. Circuit's "mosaic theory," stating that "the
fact that law enforcement are able to take information that is revealed
publicly and piece together an intimate picture of someone's life does
not raise constitutional concerns under current doctrine." 148
Essentially, a reasonable expectation of privacy hinges on whether the
information was "willingly conveyed, not that someone has aggregated
it."149

III. RESOLUTION: OVERRULING MAYNARD
When presented with the question of whether GPS tracking
infringes upon a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, courts must
decide whether a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy" as
to the movements of his car.15 0 While it may seem that Knotts directly
controls the issue at hand, distinctions between beeper technology and
GPS technology exist with regard to Fourth Amendment analysis. 15 1
The Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits agree that the use of GPS
tracking devices by police is permissible if used for short-term
tracking.152 The courts are split on whether police may use GPS for

144.
Id. at 276.
145.
Id. at 278.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 276.
148.
Id. at 283.
149.
Id.
150.
See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that the
central issue is whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements).
151.
See, e.g., id. at 557; United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007) (all three courts were able
to draw distinctions between GPS technology and the beeper technology at issue in Knotts).
During oral arguments for Jones, Chief Justice Roberts noted that being able to push a button
and track anyone from anywhere (using GPS) is very different from monitoring someone from a
helicopter using beeper technology. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, United States v. Jones,
No. 10-1259 (Nov. 8, 2011).

152.
at 998.

See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217; Garcia, 474 F.3d
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prolonged searches, ones that can extend for weeks and even
months. 153 The beeper technology employed in Knotts could only be
used to track a vehicle for a short period of time; it could not be used
to track movements for prolonged durations, and the technology
required that police always remain within close proximity of the
vehicle in order to receive the signal. 154 With GPS technology,
however, police can install a tracking device and effortlessly collect
massive amounts of data regarding a vehicle's movement. 15 5 In the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits, prolonged monitoring of a vehicle's
movement falls outside of Fourth Amendment protection; but in the
D.C. Circuit, people have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the
totality of their long-term activities and movements.1 5 6
This Note argues that, while GPS surveillance is not
commonplace,1 57 most people know that it is possible for someone to
monitor their movements over an extended period of time. As long as
one is in a publicly accessible area, a reasonable person should expect
that he may be followed and that his accumulated trips can be the
subject of surveillance. Therefore, prolonged surveillance on publicly
accessible roadways is not subject to a reasonable expectation of
privacy and should not receive Fourth Amendment protection.15 8
A. A Brief Comment on Installation
This Note addresses only the issue of whether the use of GPS
tracking devices is permissible under the Fourth Amendment and
takes no stance as to whether police officers may enter onto private
property in order to install GPS devices. Courts are unanimous that
GPS devices may be installed on vehicles located in public areas such
as parking lots, where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, judges do not agree as to whether police may install them on

Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (stating that prolonged monitoring of a vehicle's
153.
movement falls within the protection of the Fourth Amendment), with Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d
at 1217 (stating that prolonged monitoring of a vehicle's movement falls outside of the protection
of the Fourth Amendment), and Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (stating that prolonged monitoring of a
vehicle's movement falls outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment).
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983) (noting that police were only
154.
able to track the defendant while in close proximity to the beeper).
See GPS Overview, supra note 74 (describing generally what GPS technology does
155.
and how it works).
156.
See cases cited supranote 153.
157.
But see Declan McCullagh, Senator Pushes for Mobile Privacy Reform, CNET NEWS
(Mar. 22, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921 3-20045723-281 (stating GPS
tracking has become commonplace).
158.
See discussion infra Part 11I.C.
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a vehicle while it is on private property, in particular the curtilage
In Pineda-Moreno, the court
surrounding a person's home.159
employed a fact-intensive approach to determine whether the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway. 16 0
In finding for the government, the court held that the defendant had
not taken any steps to protect his driveway from the public and thus
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.161

In a dissent to an order denying a rehearing of Pineda-Moreno,
Judge Kozinski criticized the majority's holding, arguing that the
curtilage around one's home has always received special constitutional
protection and police had no right to install a GPS device on the
defendant's car while it was located in his driveway. 162 He further
criticized the court's analysis, arguing that it protected the wealthy
while leaving average citizens at a disadvantage. 16 3 For ordinary
individuals, placing a gate in their driveway is impractical and
economically infeasible; therefore, the ruling essentially granted
additional constitutional protection to individuals who have the means
to take extra precautions to block off their curtilage from the world.164
Kozinski found this inequitable and instead argued that the
Constitution should bar police from installing GPS trackers when a
car is located in the defendant's curtilage.165
The issue of whether the Fourth Amendment protects curtilage
is separate from whether police may use GPS technology to monitor a
vehicle's movements on public thoroughfares. While public roads are
always open to plain view and thus not constitutionally protected
(there is no reasonable expectation of privacy), curtilage is different
and subject to a stricter analysis. 166 Therefore, this Note does not take
a stance on the constitutionality of GPS installation on private
property.

159.
Compare United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (police may not install a GPS device on a vehicle that is in the
curtilage of one's home), with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.
2010) (police may install a GPS device on a vehicle that is in the curtilage of one's home).
160.
Pineda-Moreno,591 F.3d at 1215.
161.
Id.
162.
Pineda-Moreno,617 F.3d at 1121 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1123.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. at 1126.
165.
See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) ("[C]ourts have extended
166.
Fourth Amendment protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the
common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may
expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.").
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B. DistinguishingKyllo
It is important to mark the dissimilarities in the evidence
collected in Kyllo as compared to that obtained with the aid of GPS
surveillance in Garcia,Pineda-Moreno, and Maynard. Police in Kyllo
used a heat-detecting device to determine that the defendant's garage
roof was emitting a large amount of heat. 167 They were able to
surmise that unusual activities were occurring within the garage and
that the excess heat might be the product of a marijuana-growing
operation. 168 This was an intrusion into the sanctity of the home,
which the Supreme Court has repeatedly found to be an area of special
constitutional protection. 169 Additionally, the technology used in Kyllo
did not supply police with information that could have been collected
through observations of the naked eye. 170 It provided information
through the use of thermal imaging, evidence police could not have
collected without the help of the technology.171
In contrast, the GPS surveillance technology employed by
police in Garcia, Pineda-Moreno, and Maynard neither (1) gives any
information as to the contents of or activities within one's home; nor
(2) provides police with information that could not be collected
through naked-eye observations. 17 2 While not necessarily practical,
police can physically trail a vehicle's movements for weeks at a time,
even monitoring its movement into and out of the curtilage of the
home. 173 Though GPS technology allows for easier and less expensive
tracking of an individual's vehicle along public thoroughfares, it does
not supply police with any information that they could not obtain but
for the new technology. 174 Increasing the efficiency of police work is
not cause for an automatic bar based on Fourth Amendment

167.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
168.
Id. at 30.
169.
Id. at 40.
170.
See id. at 30 (describing the use of thermal imaging devices to detect radiation not
visible to the naked eye).
171.
Id.
172.
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v.
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1213 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 995
(7th Cir. 2007).
173.
E.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
174.
Id.
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grounds.17 5 Therefore, GPS surveillance does not raise the same
constitutional concerns as the heat-detecting device used in Kyllo.1 76
C. The Expectation of Privacy and Totality of One's Movements
The major distinction between the circuits is whether the
totality of a person's movements is open to public surveillance, or
rather, subject to a person's reasonable expectation of privacy.17 7
"Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable depends in large
part upon whether that expectation relates to information that has
been expose[d] to the public." 7 8 The D.C. Circuit notes that individual
trips are not subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy because
roadways are open to the observations of everyone. 7 9 However, the
court held that the totality of a person's movements reveals a different
story than any one individual trip, and that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the entirety of their movements.18 0
While police may glean more information by observing a
person's movements over a period of time, there should not be a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of movement. When
people enter into public space, they knowingly expose themselves and
their movements. 18 1 The test to determine whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists is not whether a person expects that a
situation will actually happen, but rather an expectation that
something could occur, a distinction that the D.C. Circuit fails to fully
analyze in its opinion. Ultimately, people have no expectation of
privacy in public places for any duration of time-police may legally
track a person's every public movement without technology for as long

175.
See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) ("Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at
birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.").
176.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
177.
Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (finding that people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for the totality of their long term activities and movements), with
Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (finding that people do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy for the totality of their long term activities and movements), and Garcia,474 F.3d at 998
(finding that people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy for the totality of their long
term activities and movements).
178.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179.
Id. ("[U]nlike one's movements during a single journey, the whole of one's
movements over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil.").
Id. at 561-62.
180.
181.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.").
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as they deem necessary. 182 Therefore, while it is unlikely that police
would engage in this type of monitoring, the possibility still exists, and
individuals consequently expect that police could track them.
Outside the realm of electronic surveillance, the Supreme
Court has considered the question of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a number of circumstances. 1 83 In Californiav. Greenwood,
the Court found that a person does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the contents in trashcans left on the curb because they
are accessible to the general public. 184 The Supreme Court stated:
"the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public." 185 In California v. Ciraolo, the Supreme Court
held that a person's expectation of privacy from visual surveillance of
the curtilage surrounding his home was not reasonable as the area
was viewable from public airspace.1 8 6 In both cases, the Supreme
Court found that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy due
to the possibility that someone legally could have accessed or seen
what the defendant attempted to hide, not that the person should
have expected that the situation would actually happen.1 8 7 With the
cases at hand (Garcia, Pineda-Moreno, and Maynard), public
roadways are not subject to any expectation of privacy, and although it
is unlikely that a person's movements will be intensely scrutinized
over an extended period of time, the possibility exists.'8 When people
place trash on their curb, they do not anticipate anyone rummaging
through it; however, people are aware that there is a chance that this
could happen and therefore do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their trash. 189
Similarly, when people drive on public thoroughfares, they
voluntarily provide information as to their whereabouts to the public,
unlike trash disposal, which is at least concealed in bags and cans.190
When a person gets in a car, he exposes the movements of that trip to

See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 276 (1983) (stating that people generally
182.
have no expectation of privacy in public places).
183.
E.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
184.
Id. at 40.
185.
Id. at 41.
186.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
187.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39 (finding that there was no expectation of privacy even
though, "[tihe trash was only temporarily on the street, and there was little likelihood that it
would be inspected by anyone"); Ciraolo,476 U.S. at 215.
188.
See cases cited supranote 177.
189.
See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40.
190.
See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
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anyone who is also on the road. 191 The accumulation of trips is made
available for anyone who wishes to watch or follow.19 2 Therefore,
there is no justification for constitutional protection over the totality of
one's movements on public thoroughfares just because those
movements as a whole reveal a different story than any one trip.193
Furthermore, the Supreme Court acquiesced to long-term
technological tracking in Karo.194 While it held that the police's
activities were unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment, it did not
do so based on the concern that police had used technology to track a
can of ether for longer than four months.195 In holding there was
probable cause to issue a search warrant for the defendant's home in
Karo, the Supreme Court referenced evidence obtained by the tracking
device that did not violate constitutional protections, including the
movements of the defendant's car.196 Thus, the Court was implicitly
condoning prolonged beeper tracking. 197
The Court held that the information obtained by the tracking
device was improper because it led to information regarding the
contents of the defendant's home when the ether can containing the
beeper device was removed from the defendant's car.198 Essentially,
the Court found that evidence obtained by tracking devices is
permissible, even in a prolonged search, as long as the tracking device
is not used to peer into a constitutionally protected private area. 9 9
D. Analogy to Video Technology Surveillance
In Garcia, the Seventh Circuit references the similarities
between GPS tracking and prolonged use of video surveillance. 2 0 0
While the Supreme Court has never reviewed video surveillance of
public areas, circuit courts have widely held that the practice does not

191.
Id.
192.
See cases cited supra note 177.
193.
See supranotes 178-80 and accompanying text.
194.
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984).
195.
Id. at 714-18.
196.
Id. at 719.
197.
Id.
Id. at 721 ("[T]here was no violation of the Fourth Amendment as to anyone with or
198.
without standing to complain about monitoring the beeper while it was located in [the
defendant's] truck.").
199.
Id. at 719.
200.
See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing
cameras mounted on lampposts).
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infringe on Fourth Amendment rights.2 0 1 Many of the arguments in
support of allowing video surveillance of public areas mirror those in
the GPS cases-most notably that the video surveillance does not give
authorities any information that could not be obtained by warrantless
in-person visual surveillance and that the technology does not peer
into constitutionally protected private areas. 202 Holding that the
government could use long-range cameras to record activity in an open
field, the Fourth Circuit stated, "Under our jurisprudence, [police]
could have stationed agents to surveil [the defendant's] property
twenty-four hours a day. That the agents chose to use a more
resource-efficient surveillance method does not change our Fourth
Amendment analysis." 203 Prolonged video surveillance often gives
police much of the same information that prolonged GPS tracking
does, allowing police to learn if a person is repeatedly visiting certain
places. To follow the D.C. Circuit's "mosaic" totality of movement
theory would implicitly contradict the analysis and holdings of the
video surveillance cases. 204 A rule of law which states that evidence
collected through GPS tracking in public areas is not afforded Fourth
Amendment protection-as individuals do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in those areas-is consistent with federal
decisions regarding video surveillance. 20 5 If the Supreme Court adopts
the D.C. Circuit's holding and analysis, it would effectively throw all
of the previously settled rules of law regarding video surveillance into
disarray. If the Court were to adopt the "mosaic theory," it may need
to consider the issue of whether the use of basic surveillance cameras
also crosses constitutional lines.
E. Bright-Line Benefits
In terms of application, a rule that permits the use of GPS
surveillance for any duration of time is more easily administered from
the perspective of both the police and the courts than the ambiguous
standard 206 promulgated by the D.C. Circuit. There are a number of
E.g., United States v. Vankesteren, 553 F.3d 286, 287 (4th Cir. 2009); United States
201.
v. Melver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 677 (9th
Cir. 1991).
202.
See Taketa, 923 F.2d at 677 ("Videotaping of suspects in public places, such as
banks, does not violate the [F]ourth [A]mendment; the police may record what they normally
may view with the naked eye.").
203.
Vankesteren, 553 F.3d at 291 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., id. (noting that video surveillance can show multiple trips to a single
204.
location).
205.
See, e.g., id.; McIver, 186 F.3d at 1125.
See supra Part II.B.
206.
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arguments for bright-line rules in lieu of ambiguous standards. 207
Professor Kathleen Sullivan lays out the benefits of these rules in her
article The Justices of Rules and Standards.208 First, bright-line rules
promote fairness and equality by removing the arbitrariness and bias
from judicial decision making. 209 Next, rules provide certainty and
predictability. 2 10 Within the GPS surveillance context, a bright-line
rule would allow police to know that they are able to use GPS tracking
without having to worry that their actions may be challenged in court.
Bright-line rules also release courts from much of their burden by
"minimizing the elaborate, time-consuming, and repetitive application
of background principles to facts." 2 11 Finally, rules are essential to
liberty; rules allow people to know how the government will use its
power, and permits individuals to plan their "affairs on the basis of
this knowledge." 212
There are a number of benefits to standards as well, including
intensive analysis and application to particular facts. 213 Standards
force judges to deliberate and think carefully about the implications of
their decisions. 2 14 Despite this, rules are better suited to the use of
GPS tracking. Prohibiting GPS surveillance over a "prolonged period
of time" is an ambiguous and open-ended standard. It provides police
with no guidance as to what is prolonged and what surveillance is
acceptable without a warrant. 215 Vague standards offer no suggestion
as to the threshold where surveillance becomes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. 2 16 Because GPS surveillance does not require a
warrant on Fourth Amendment grounds, courts should universally
adopt a bright-line rule allowing law enforcement to use tracking
devices for any duration of time.

207.
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
62 (1992).
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
210.
211.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
212.
Id. at 66-67.
213.
214.
Id. at 67.
215.
Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" of Fourth Amendment, Holds
GPS Monitoring a FourthAmendment Search, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM),
http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holdsgps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search.
216.
Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The open roads of America are exactly that-open to anyone
who wants to use them. Every movement and turn is traceable to the
public. 217 While driving in public, you expose yourself to the public
and have no reasonable expectation of privacy for your movements. 2 18
Recently, police have used GPS technology to help monitor the
movements of criminal suspects. Police can install a small device on a
suspect's car and let it collect information on the car's movements
instead of requiring twenty-four-hour, in-person monitoring. 219 The
GPS device records only information that could be picked up by the
naked eye. 2 20 Unlike other technologies that enhance the senses, GPS
tracking provides police with information they could have otherwise
procured. Law enforcement's ability to use GPS tracking devices to
monitor suspects' movements is not without its critics outside the
legal arena. 22 1 A recent Time Magazine article states,
After all, if government agents can track people with secretly planted GPS devices
virtually anytime they want, without having to go to a court for a warrant, we are one
step closer to a classic police state-with technology taking on the role of the KGB or the
222
East German Stasi.

However, as long as police are able to track a vehicle in person
without a warrant, the rule for GPS tracking should be the same. So,
next time you are driving around and you feel like you are being
followed, your instincts may be correct. With no expectation of privacy
on the open road, you might be transporting a little black box in your
vehicle. Drivers beware-somebody may be watching you!
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